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This paper looks at the causes of rural conflict in 1930s Spain. Rather than 
stressing bottom-up forces of mobilisation linked to poor harvests and rural 
unemployment or the inability of the state to enforce reformist legislation, this 
paper explores the role of state policy in sorting out the acute coordination 
and collective action problems of mobilising rural labourers. I do so by looking 
at the effects of intervention on rural labour markets in dry-farming areas of 
Spain (parts of Castile and of Andalusia). Given the difficulties of constructing 
a conclusive test of my hypothesis, I follow three indirect testing strategies. 
Firstly, I look at the qualitative evidence on the functioning of labour markets 
in dry-farming areas of Spain. Secondly, because my argument implies the 
existence of severe restrictions to the labour supply of rural labourers during 
the harvest in the early 1930s, I study the evolution of harvest-to-winter 
wage ratios before and after the passing of legislation. Thirdly, in order to 
show that alternative hypotheses to explain rural conflict are not consistent 
with the historical record, I study the diffusion of union offices and general 
strikes in the early 1930s in several dry-farming provinces of Spain. 
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ABSTRACT: This paper looks at the causes of rural conflict in 1930s Spain. Rather than stressing 
bottom-up forces of mobilisation linked to poor harvests and rural unemployment or the inability of the 
state to enforce reformist legislation, this paper explores the role of state policy in sorting out the acute 
coordination and collective action problems of mobilising rural labourers. I do so by looking at the 
effects of intervention on rural labour markets in dry-farming areas of Spain (parts of Castile and of 
Andalusia). Given the difficulties of constructing a conclusive test of my hypothesis, I follow three 
indirect testing strategies. Firstly, I look at the qualitative evidence on the functioning of labour 
markets in dry-farming areas of Spain. Secondly, because my argument implies the existence of severe 
restrictions to the labour supply of rural labourers during the harvest in the early 1930s, I study the 
evolution of harvest-to-winter wage ratios before and after the passing of legislation. Thirdly, in order 
to show that alternative hypotheses to explain rural conflict are not consistent with the historical record, 
I study the diffusion of union offices and general strikes in the early 1930s in several dry-farming 




In the 1930s, Spain reached an unprecedented stage of social mobilisation and 
political participation. Male universal suffrage was passed in 1931, and women were 
given the right to vote for the first time in the 1933 general election. The Second 
Republic (1931-1936) was, however, besieged by a wave of social unrest that would 
put the Spanish experience on par in terms of union growth and strike intensity with 
that of such troubled societies as Germany, Austria or Italy after the First World War.1 
Although the historiography does not consider the war an inevitable outcome, it is 
generally accepted that the onset of the Civil War (1936-1939) was related to the 
instability and polarisation of the Second Republic.2 
 
                                                 
1
 For comparisons: Mann, “Sources”; Freeman, “Spurts.” 
2
 Jackson, Republic, p. 480; Casanova,  Republic, p. 2. 
 2 
Perhaps the most novel phenomenon of this process of massive social change 
was the mobilisation of peasants and rural workers. Rural strikes had been important 
in some areas in the 1880s, the early 20th century or in 1918-1920, but the magnitude 
of mobilisation in the 1930s was unprecedented. Rural conflict did not stop with 
landless labourers, as sharecroppers also mobilised in the 1930s. However, this paper 
deals exclusively with the mobilisation of rural workers in cereal-growing areas of 
Spain, most of them landless labourers, and leaves for further study the mobilisation 
of sharecroppers.  
 
There are two main hypotheses, which can be seen as related, put forward in 
the literature about the mobilisation of rural workers in 1930s Spain. Firstly, rural 
workers mobilised and protested because the Republic was too slow to implement the 
long-awaited land reform and pro-worker legislation and was unable to confront 
employers’ opposition to these laws.3 Secondly, abysmally low living standards, 
unemployment and poor harvests ignited the countryside.4 In both cases, it is claimed 
that a spontaneous, bottom-up process of mobilisation took place in the Spanish 
countryside. 
 
Despite their intuitive appeal, explanations positing a bottom-up process of 
mobilisation can be attacked on several grounds. Firstly, “frustration-aggression” 
mechanisms for explaining movements of protest have been long discredited, 
especially because these explanations are naïve about the phenomenal co-ordination 
problems involved in the organisation of mass social movements.5. Secondly, no one 
                                                 
3
 Casanova, Republic, p. 37, pp. 47-48, p. 51; Shubert, History, pp. 100-103; Graham, Civil war, p. 14. 
4
 Preston, Civil war, p. 55, p. 57, p. 68; Graham, Republic, p. 41; Malefakis, Agrarian reform, chapter 
11; Casanova, De la calle, p. 47. More qualified: Payne, Collapse, p. 61. 
5
 Among many others: Shorter and Tilly, Strikes, pp. 6-7; Béteille, Agrarian, p. 188. 
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doubts that life was brutal in early 20th century Spain for landless labourers, but there 
is no reason to suspect that living conditions were poorer in the 1930s than in 
previous periods of time. Protected behind high tariff walls and with stable wheat 
prices, agricultural incomes mostly depended on the size of the harvest.6 Poor wheat 
harvests in 1931 and 1933 alternated with exceptionally good harvests in 1932 and 
1934, with no apparent correlation with the intensity of social conflict.7 As figure 1 
shows, rural real wages increased in the 1930s.  
 
 
Figure 1. Average real wage in agriculture, 1913-1935 (1913=100). 
 
 
Rural conflict in 1930s Spain has also been linked to the slowing of previous 
structural change. With the collapse of the construction sector in the early 1930s, 
unskilled immigrants lost their jobs and returned to the agricultural sector. Return 
migration led to the overcrowding of rural labour markets and, therefore, to 
unemployment and falling wages. 8 Conflict naturally followed. 
 
But the link between return migration and conflict is doubtful. Research on 
internal migrations in Spain shows that high-conflict provinces of Western Andalusia, 
Extremadura and, to a lesser extent, South Castile were not well integrated into the 
Spanish labour market. In the first three decades of the 20th century, they showed low 
out-migration rates, despite being among the poorest regions of Spain. Historians of 
Spanish migrations have suggested that one explanation is that these areas were far 
                                                 
6
 Simpson, “Tariff;” Sabaté, Fillat, Gracia, “Backlash.” Barciela et al., Sector agrario, p. 336. 
7
 Barciela et al., Sector agrario, p. 336. 
8
 Among others, for example, Graham,  Republic, p. 35.  
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away from the main destination points of domestic migrations (Biscay, Catalan 
industrial cities, and Madrid), although factors like human capital or information must 
have played a role.9 Because conflict-prone provinces had few emigrants in the 1920s, 
it is difficult to accept return migration as a cause of rural conflict. 
 
Rather than arguing that lack of reform triggered the explosion of rural unrest, 
this paper claims that, at least in the case of dry-farming areas, the impact of decisive 
labour market intervention on collective action caused the rise of rural militancy. 
Government intervention altered the costs and benefits of participating in rural unions, 
whilst it re-distributed bargaining power towards local workers and away from 
seasonal migrants. Rural mobilisation and strikes resulted mainly from top-down legal 
and institutional changes of vast magnitude and effects.10  
 
Because it is impossible to find in the historical record conclusive evidence to 
defend my hypothesis, I structure its defense using three different layers of evidence. 
Firstly, I consider the qualitative evidence on the functioning of rural labour markets 
in dry-farming provinces before and after legal changes. Secondly, because my 
argument implies the existence of severe restrictions to the labour supply of rural 
labourers in the 1930s, I argue that the seasonal increase of labour demand associated 
with wheat harvests must have increased harvest wages in cereal-growing areas in 
comparison with harvest wages in the same area in a counterfactual situation with no 
restrictions to hiring and to labour mobility. In order to see whether this was indeed 
the case, I trace the evolution of the harvest-to-winter ratios before and after the 
passing of legislation. Thirdly, I analyse at the diffusion of union offices and rural 
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 Silvestre, “Internal,” p. 255, p. 257. 
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general strikes in several dry-farming provinces. In particular, I explore the possibility 
that higher levels of conflict are found in areas in which it was easy for employers to 
organise collective action (because there were very few of them). Moreover, I also 
test the bottom-up hypothesis by looking at the effects of greater presence of 




Spain witnessed a rapid growth in union participation and conflict in 1931-1933, but 
most of this growth occurred in agriculture. Rural workers accounted for almost half 
of the explosive gains of the socialist General Workers’ Union (Unión General de 
Trabajadores, henceforth UGT) and membership was concentrated in the provinces 
of Córdoba, Jaén and Málaga in Andalusia, in Toledo and Ciudad Real in the centre 
of Spain and in Cáceres and Badajoz in Extremadura (South-West of Spain), linked to 
the growth of the National Federation of Agricultural Workers (Federación Nacional 
de Trabajadores de la Tierra, FNTT).11 In just two years, the FNTT jumped from 
about 47,000 members when it was created in June 1930 to around 450,000 in 1932. 
Membership of the anarcho-syndicalist union National Confederation of Labour 
(Confederación Nacional del Trabajo, CNT) exploded in 1931 (claiming more than 
300,000 rural members in Andalusia alone) and declined thereafter, although 
membership numbers are fragmentary after 1931.12 The number of strikers also rose 
fast in the period: in 1932-1933, the number of rural strikers as a proportion of those 
employed in agriculture had multiplied by six with respect to the previous peak in 
1918-1920. 
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 Bizcarrondo, UGT, p. 200. 
12
 Maurice, Anarquismo, p. 28; Memoria CNT; Casanova, De la calle, pp. 28-29. 
 6 
 
 How can this process of large social change be explained? The starting point 
of my argument is the consideration of unions as institutions that aggregate the 
preferences of their members regarding working conditions and wages.13 Unions 
might have other objectives –more labour-friendly laws, a more democratic polity or a 
particular stance in foreign policy - but this does not alter the fact that the main task of 
unions is to bargain with employers and the state for better working conditions for 
their members. 
 
 Unions have a fundamental problem of collective action in that they bargain 
“public goods” like hours of work or higher wages. As no worker can be excluded 
from the public goods obtained by unions, it is rational for individuals to avoid the 
costs being in unions: paying union dues, foregoing earnings by taking part in strikes, 
or facing retaliation by employers or the state. Therefore, to guarantee a high level of 
individual involvement, the union relies on well-known mechanisms to penalise those 
who do not participate: violence against strikebreakers, social penalties against non-
union members, or preventing non-union workers from finding work (the closed 
shop).14 
 
My argument builds upon this insight of collective action theory. Republican 
governments started intervening the labour market, giving all the power to decide who 
was hired to unions and taking this power from employers. With the legendary 
Socialist leader Francisco Largo Caballero appointed as Labour Minister, the 
government passed a series of decrees in the autumn of 1931. Firstly, there was a law 
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 Freeman and Madoff, Unions, pp. 9-10. 
14
 Olson, Logic, p. 69. 
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of employment (ley de ocupación obrera) that created local labour exchanges, which 
organised the hiring of workers. Secondly, the government decreed the creation of 
local and provincial boards of conciliation (jurados mixtos), which had the 
responsibility to draw up collective contracts and make sure they were enforced. 
Finally, the law of municipal boundaries (ley de términos municipales) established 
that migrants could not be hired in a town if there were unemployed local workers.15  
 
The main hypothesis of this paper is that these laws radically altered the costs 
and benefits of participating in unions and gave unions a greater ability to punish 
neutrals and strikebreakers in strikes. Until June 1934, rural unions enforced a closed 
shop aided by legislation that radically increased the costs of not participating in 
collective action. This legislation was reinforced by restrictions on the employment of 
temporary migrants, which reduced the need to reconcile the preferences of different 
types of workers. Given these institutional changes, an endogenous explosion of 
union participation and strikes was inevitable. 
 
III  
The first step in my analysis is to understand the working of rural labour markets in 
dry-farming areas of early 20th century Spain. Perhaps for the lack of evidence, 
historians of the 1930s have not fully integrated the role of temporary migrations in 
the functioning of labour markets in the dry-farming regions of Spain (a large area 
comprising the centre and South-West of Spain).16 The main characteristic of labour 
markets in these regions was the very short working year. Without alternative crops, 
labour demand fluctuated wildly throughout the year, peaking during harvest time in 
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 Casanova, Republic, pp. 43-44. 
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 The main exceptions are: Carmona and Simpson, Laberinto, chapter 3; Silvestre, “Temporary;” 
Florencio Puntas and López Martínez, “Trabajo.”  
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the summer and falling in the winter. As a result, the working year was about 180 to 
200 days long and workers remained unemployed for several months.17 However, in 
the summer, the demand for labour was so high as to require the migration of 
temporary workers from other parts of the country who were attracted by the high 
wages.  
 
Despite their importance, we know little about temporary migrations. It is 
difficult to trace migratory flows because they were rarely captured by the population 
censuses.18 What we know from the historical evidence is that there was a long-
established pattern of migrations from neighbouring hilly areas to the fertile plains.19 
Gangs of workers from the towns of Málaga descended to the plain around Jerez de la 
Frontera (Cádiz) in harvest time and peasants from Almería and Granada went to 
cereal-growing areas of Córdoba and Sevilla (all in Andalusia). Short-distance moves 
were also typical within the provinces of Córdoba, Seville and Cádiz (in Andalusia). 
In addition, there were several long-distance flows, the most famous one being the 
movement of Galician and Portuguese peasants to harvest wheat in Castile and 
Northern Andalusia. Furthermore, workers emigrated from the Levant to South 
Castile and the Ebro basin (see map 1). 20  
 
[Insert MAP 1] 
 
Given the lack of quantitative evidence, we know very little about the long-
term trends for these flows. It seems plausible, however, that the increasing 
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 Carmona and Simpson, Laberinto, p. 98; Bernal, “Rebaño,” p. 86. 
18
 Silvestre, “Temporary,” is the best attempt to document these flows using the population censuses.  
19
 Pitt-Rivers, People, p. 39. 
20
 “Segadores,” El Socialista, 26 Semptember 1924. 
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mechanisation of harvest work in the first decades of the 20th century reduced labour 
needs. In the centre and north of Spain mechanisation advanced significantly in the 
first three decades of the twentieth century, whereas in the South mechanisation was 
slow except in the province of Seville. However, it is well established mechanisation 
progressed slowly in Spain in comparison with more developed European economies 
and that temporary migrations remained important in the 1920s. 21 
 
In this context, collective action problems were severe: local rural workers 
faced the competition of temporary migrants (“forasteros”), who were generally 
willing to act as strikebreakers. Local, permanent workers with a very short working 
year had an interest in extending the harvesting season, and therefore, preferred to be 
paid time rates rather than piece rates and to work shorter hours. Temporary migrants, 
alternatively, preferred piece rates and work “de sol a sol” (from dawn to dusk), so as 
to shorten the harvest as much as possible and move on to the next town.  
 
In the autumn of 1931, legislative changes radically altered the bargaining 
power held by each group of workers. Employers could not freely decide who was to 
be hired. Instead, workers accessed jobs following the turno (names were given to 
employers by local boards of conciliation according to their position in a list of 
eligible workers). In addition, especially after the law of municipal boundaries, local 
workers enjoyed a privileged position in labour markets: no temporary migrant could 
be hired if local workers remained unemployed. With restrictions to temporary 
migrations, local workers’ bargaining power was very high in the weeks before the 
harvest because strikers could cause large losses by refusing to harvest the ripe wheat.  
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Evidence of the functioning of rural labour markets before 1931 is not abundant and I 
have to rely on heterogeneous evidence. For example, from April 1924 to April 1925 
El Socialista published several responses to the survey undertaken by the socialist 
politician Fernando de los Ríos on working and living conditions in rural areas. This 
evidence needs to be interpreted with caution as one inevitably suspects the presence 
of several biases in the evidence produced by unions and militants, but the accounts 
are consistent with the historical record of very weak union organisation until the 
1930s, except for the period of 1918-1920.  
 
From this evidence, however, a coherent picture appears. In the market for 
rural labourers, there were two traditional mechanisms through which workers were 
hired. In both cases, there was minimal union intervention and, therefore, no co-
ordinated mechanism for settling wages and working conditions. Firstly, individual 
workers or gangs of workers offered their work directly to farms. Secondly, workers 
in large towns waited in the main square for foremen to choose them for a harvest 
season or particular tasks.22 Carmona and Simpson (2003) assert that this strategy 
probably made sense: it was rational for workers to live in relatively large towns 
because they were hired by several employers for short periods of time and, in large 
towns, there was a greater availability of information.23 
 
 Before the 1930s, 1918-1920 is the only period in which it is safe to say that 
unions controlled the labour market in some areas, especially the provinces of 
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 El Socialista, 7th March 1924; El Socialista, 21st March 1924; El Socialista, 4th April 1924; El 
Socialista, 6th June 1924; El Socialista, 30th October 1925; Fraser, In hiding, pp. 106-107. 
23
 Carmona and Simpson, Laberinto, p. 99. 
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Córdoba and Ciudad Real. According to Juan Díaz del Moral, several local collective 
contracts were approved for the wheat harvests of 1918 and 1919.24 Andalusian 
unions were very effective at using boycott tactics against non-union workers, and 
especially temporary migrants.25 However, after the summer of 1919, martial law was 
declared in the region and unions quickly declined. Díaz del Moral cites several cases 
of local unions disappearing between 1920 and 1922.26 Employers managed to 
enforce individual contracting as a result. 
 
Therefore, it was only in 1931 that labour markets experienced a fundamental 
break. The qualitative evidence points to substantial changes of labour recruiting 
practices. For example, the famous Castilian writer Miguel de Unamuno complained 
bitterly in 1932 about the enormous power wielded by those who made the lists of 
eligible workers.27 Local studies show that, in the early 1930s unions controlled and 
organized the hiring of workers in towns as far apart as Mijas (in the province of 
Málaga, in Andalusia), Los Olivos (in Huelva, Andalusia), La Solana (in Ciudad Real, 
South Castile) and Belmonte de los Caballeros (in Zaragoza, Aragon).28 Obviously, 
the incentives to join unions were now strong. In a most eloquent statement, Jerome 
Mintz mentioned the testimony of a worker in Casas Viejas (in Cádiz, Andalusia) 
arguing he joined the union because “they said if one didn’t sign with the sindicato, 
one could not get work.”29  
 
                                                 
24
 Díaz del Moral, Historia, pp. 329-330; IRS, Información, pp. 8-9. 
25
 Díaz del Moral, Historia, pp. 337-338; IRS, Información, “Primer informe del Sr. delegado regional 
estadístico, Joaquín de Palacios Cárdenas.” 
26
 Díaz del Moral, Historia, p. 358. 
27
 El Sol, 5th June 1932: “(…) En el fondo, lucha de clasificación. Quién será bracero listado y quién 
será ojeador –trabajador de ojo, listero.” “A fight of classification. Who is going to be listed labourer 
and who is going to be the workers’ scout, the list-maker”.  Emphasis added. 
28
 Fraser, In hiding, pp. 106-107; Fraser, Pueblo, p. 60; Lisón-Tolosana, Belmonte, p. 46; Collier, 
Socialists, p. 79, pp. 84-85; Del Rey, Paisanos, p. 346. 
29
 Mintz, Casas Viejas, p. 164, as well p. 167, p. 173. 
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Employers complained bitterly that they had lost the power to decide whom to 
hire and in fact saw the turno as an imposition by the unions. Yet, the Republican-
Socialist coalition saw the turno as one of the main instruments for combating poverty 
and unemployment in the countryside. In a famous strike in the province of 
Salamanca (North Castile) in 1933, the union denounced employers who did not 
employ workers from the local lists and who therefore did not honour the turno. In an 
effort to enforce the turno, the state stepped in to disband the gangs of temporary 
migrants contracted by employers. A lock-out ensued in which rural employers 
insisted on free contracting. At this point, the UGT called for a general strike of rural 
workers. To avoid a larger social explosion, the government sponsored an agreement 
that established that the civil governor and the Ministry of Labour delegate of the 
province would draw the list of eligible workers.30  
 
The large institutional change put in place in 1931-33 was radically modified 
in 1934. In November 1933, a conservative coalition won the elections. Although the 
new government wanted to put limits to the actions of the boards of conciliation and 
to change the law of municipal boundaries, the government did not initially have a 
strong stance against collective bargaining. But with their grip on boards of 
conciliation and labour exchanges threatened, in June 1934, rural unions staged a 
general strike to demand higher wages and a reversal of the planned repeal of the law 
on municipal boundaries and the reform of the law of conciliation boards.31 
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 Cabrera, Patronal, pp. 156-158. 
31
 Shubert, Social history, p. 101. Malefakis, Agrarian reform, pp. 335-336; Cabrera, Patronal, p. 192. 
A reform, but not a full reversal, of the socialist legislation was also in the programme of the Radical 
Party: Casanova, Republic, p. 99; Payne, Collapse, p. 61. See for example: Estadella, Fracaso. 
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The strike met with staunch repression, the closing of union offices, and the 
arrest of socialist leaders. As a result, the whole institutional structure built up in 1931 
changed accordingly. Consistent with my hypothesis, the new top-down changes 
radically reduced the incentives for joining independent unions. Although data on 
hiring practices and labour market outcomes in 1935 would be very useful to 
understand the impact of legislation, historical evidence for this year is scarce. 
Censorship was imposed after October 1934 and official statistics are poor for 1935. 
The general picture is that several unions and their leaders faced repression, and there 
was a very large drop in the number of strikes and membership.  
 
Boards of conciliation and labour exchanges did not disappear but were now 
used to punish militant workers. For example, the UGT published several reports sent 
by rural union offices describing the situation in late 1934 and 1935.32 Although the 
evidence can be biased, most militants interestingly focused on the disruption of local 
exchanges and on the fact that now the socialists were now the ones excluded from 
the available jobs. For example, this was the case in Aliseda (Cáceres, 
Extremadura),33 in Valcabado (Zamora, North Castile),34 in Villamayor de Calatrava 
(Ciudad Real, South Castile).35 As a result, many workers left the socialist unions to 
join the catholic unions or simply to show allegiance to the owners of land.36 This 
suggests that when the socialists did not control the exchanges, there were far less 
powerful reasons to join unions. As a result, only the very militant stayed and union 
membership collapsed. Strike and membership levels were very low in 1935, only to 
soar explosively with the arrival of the Popular Front in 1936.  
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 Boletín UGT, number 64, April 1934, pp. 72-79. 
33
 Bizcarrondo, UGT, p. 219. 
34
 Bizcarrondo, UGT, p. 220. 
35
 Bizcarrondo, UGT, pp. 229. 
36
 Bizcarrondo, UGT, pp. 220-221, p. 225. 
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Evidence on the anarcho-syndicalists (the CNT) is certainly more mixed.  
Aggregate membership grew fast in 1931 in several traditional holds of anarcho-
syndicalists in Córdoba, Cádiz, Málaga and Seville.37 Although the CNT did not 
accept state-sponsored labour exchanges, it certainly signed collective contracts that 
restricted the freedom to hire by imposing bans on temporary workers and demanding 
that the household heads be chosen first for harvest jobs.38 However, my emphasis on 
the importance of labour exchanges would also be consistent with the stagnation of 
the CNT in the countryside after 1931. Because they did not accept the existence of 
boards of conciliation and insisted on direct action, the anarcho-syndicalists were not 
able to benefit to the same extent from the state-enforced lists of workers and state 
protection of collective agreements reached by the local or provincial boards of 
conciliation. Several conflicts in 1931 can be interpreted as attempts by the CNT to 
limit the influence of UGT-dominated boards of conciliation, especially in the 
province of Córdoba.39 But most attempts to boycott agreements by the local or 
provincial boards of conciliation with general strikes generally met with state 
repression and, occasionally, the lack of support from the rank-and-file.40 Although 
anarcho-syndicalist unions had traditionally organised the countryside, especially in 
Andalusia, it was the UGT that benefited most from the new legislation.  
 
Furthermore, unions’ control over local labour markets was helped by the 
disruption of temporary migrations. Temporary migrants, by their willingness to act 
as strikebreakers and their reluctance to join unions, had been a serious constraint on 
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 For example, Fraser, In hiding, p. XIV. 
38
 Pérez Yruela, Conflictividad, pp. 124-126. 
39
 Pérez Yruela, Conflictividad, pp. 123-126, p. 137; Casanova, Republic, p. 53.  
40
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the stabilisation of unions. The mechanisation of harvest work in the first decades of 
the 20th century must have slowed down migration.41 In the 1920s according to 
contemporary sociologist and law professor Constancio Bernaldo de Quirós, there 
was a sizeable decline in the number of emigrants from Galicia (in the North-West), 
although his analysis is fully impressionistic.42 However, probably because 
agricultural tasks did not mechanise as fast as in other European countries, qualitative 
evidence shows temporary migrations were still an important phenomenon in the 
1920s.43 For example, one respondent complained that “unemployment exists because 
workers from different towns chase the same jobs.”44 Another from Alicante claimed 
that “large numbers” migrated to olive-growing areas in the winter. Similar examples 
are easy to find for Extremadura or Northern Andalusia.45  
 
The empirical question then is: to what extent were temporary migrations 
disrupted as a result of institutional changes? State-sponsored collective contracts 
established a clear preference for local workers, although this law was subject to some 
ad hoc changes until it was finally derogated in May 1934. For example, a certain 
degree of mobility was allowed in the province of Córdoba during the olive-picking 
campaign in the winter of 1932 and in 1933 in Extremadura.46 These changes suggest 
legislation was flexible enough to respond to local shortages of labour during harvest 
time. In any case, however, local workers always took precedence over temporary 
migrants.47 
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 Carmona and Simpson, Laberinto, p. 109. 
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 El Socialista, 26th September 1924. 
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 Simpson, Siesta, p. 172. 
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  El Socialista, 4th April 1924. 
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 ABC, 7th December 1932; Riesco, ‘Lucha,’ p. 132. 
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When determining if temporary migrations were disrupted, the population 
census is not useful. The 1930 census was taken before the law was passed, and the 
next census was taken in 1940, when the law had been abrogated and independent 
unions were not legal. Therefore, censuses would not capture any temporary (but 
fundamental) break in the 1930s. In order to uncover the behaviour of temporary 
migrations and rural unions in the 1930s, we have to turn to the qualitative evidence.  
 
The evidence available shows that temporary workers had a much harder time 
finding employment. In July 1931, an MP from Málaga (Andalusia) wrote a letter to 
the president of the Republic, complaining that there were about 40,000 unemployed 
workers in the province who could not find harvest jobs in Granada or Seville (both in 
Andalusia).48 In Extremadura, Sergio Riesco uncovered several protests in which 
mayors complained to the Ministry of the Interior that workers could not find work in 
other towns.49 In North Castile, a rural landowner claimed that in the harvest of 1933 
(a year of a poor harvest) local workers did not look for employment in other towns, 
and that in 1934 (a year of an exceptionally good harvest) he was not confident that 
they could get temporary migrants to harvest the wheat quickly.50  
 
Despite the priority given to local workers, some temporary workers managed 
to be hired. As a result, conflicts between temporary forasteros and local workers 
were abundant in the early 1930s, especially in 1931, although the evidence points to 
local workers now having the upper hand in determining who was hired. This was for 
                                                 
48
 El Sol, 15th July 1931. 
49
 Riesco, ‘Lucha,’ pp. 132-135. 
50
 El Sol, 6th June 1934. See as well: Rey, Paisanos, pp. 123-125, p. 293; Pérez Yruela, Conflictividad, 
p. 124. 
 17 
example the case for strikes in Baena (Jaén) and Utrera (Seville) in July 1931,51 and 
local workers’ complaints to the prefect in La Rinconada (Seville).52 Cases of clashes 
in provinces like Toledo or Ávila were also typical.53  
 
Moreover, unions could rely on the state to enforce the preferential 
employment of local workers. In Carmona (Seville), when sugarbeet producers told 
the prefect they wanted to keep non-local workers, the prefect replied that he could 
not authorise the employment of non-locals if there were local unemployed workers.54 
Similarly, the prefect of Córdoba manifested local workers had absolute priority and 
ordered the gangs of temporary workers to go back to their towns, often with the help 
of the Guardia Civil.55 It is easy to find other cases for the provinces of Jaén and 
Cádiz in Andalusia or Salamanca in North Castile.56  
 
V 
Bacause I have relied so far on qualitative evidence covering a vast geographic area, 
some of the claims put forward in this article need hard evidence to be proven. How 
do we know if restrictions on temporary migrations were enforced in the 1930s? Were 
local workers often favoured by labour exchanges? This question is difficult to answer 
directly. Temporary migrations were not captured by the population census. 
Additionally, we cannot measure local union strength on the basis of local wages 
because wages in many cases were standardised at the provincial or regional level. 
Therefore, we need an indirect method.  
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Following Sokoloff and Dollar (1997) seminal article on seasonal labour 
demand fluctuations in English agriculture before the Industrial Revolution, a 
potential test for this hypothesis involves looking at the ratio of harvest wages to 
winter wages at different periods of time.57 According to Sokoloff and Dollar, the 
harvest-to-winter wage ratio is higher where the proportion of agricultural land 
devoted to cereals is higher. In highly specialised cereal-growing regions, there is 
little to do in the winter and the opportunity cost of winter work is very low. As a 
result, the ratio of harvest wages to wages paid for winter tasks should be higher in 
regions specialised in cereal production as compared with less cereal-intensive 
regions.  
 
The argument for my test proceeds as follows. Many dry-farming areas of 
Spain were specialised in cereal production. Consequently, one should observe large 
seasonal gaps in those regions. However, the mobility of temporary migrants during 
harvest, by increasing the supply of available workers, reduced the ratio of harvest-to-
winter wages. If Republican governments re-distributed rents towards the local 
workers and away from the temporary migrants, one should observe a substantial 
widening of the harvest-to-winter ratio in the 1930s.  
 
High quality information on rural wages is scarce, especially for the 1920s. 
Ideally, one should gather information of harvest-to-winter ratios in the late 1920s or 
in 1930 and then compare that with the same information in 1932 and 1933. However, 
to my knowledge, high quality data on seasonal rural wages in the 1920s does not 
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 Sokoloff and Dollar, “Seasonality.”   
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exist.58 To sort this out, I rely first on information on rural wages in different seasons 
of the year in 1914 at the level of the province (similar to the English county) 
published in the 1915 Spanish statistical yearbook, but probably collected in an 
unknown period between 1909 and 1914.59  
 
The Spanish Statistical Yearbook of 1915 gives maximum, average and 
minimum daily wages for adult males. Money wages were adjusted upwards to take 
into account the part of wages paid in kind.60 Average wages for adult males were 
calculated as an average of all summer adult male wages, which included also tasks 
outside the harvest.61 Harvest wages were higher than winter wages, but not the 
highest wages paid in the summer.62 Therefore, because my focus in on the harvest-
to-winter ratio in 1914 and in the 1930s, my preferred comparison uses average wages 
in 1914. However, I also calculate the summer-to-winter ratio using maximum wages 
to check the robustness of my results. 
 
For the 1920s, I collect wage data using the El Socialista survey of 1924-1925. 
Occasionally, unions gave detailed information on the types of agricultural jobs and 
the hours, days of work and wages assigned to each task. Data however are not 
abundant as unions were generally in disarray after 1920. Using this source, I was 
only able to gather local information on harvest-to-winter ratios for several towns in 
eight provinces. 
 
                                                 
58
 This is confirmed by the most authoritative study of factor prices, and wages in particular, in Spanish 
agriculture: Bringas, Productividad, pp. 91-94; as well, Simpson, “Wages.” 
59
 AE 1915, pp. 244-245. On the collection of data: IRS, Preparación 1914, p. 212. 
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 IRS, Preparación 1914, p. 225. 
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 IRS, Preparación 1914, p. 225. 
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 IRS, Preparación 1908, pp. 227-230. 
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Finally, for the 1930s, I exploit the rich information contained in the agrarian 
collective contracts published by Mariano González-Rothvoss in 1935. Some of these 
collective contracts cover entire provinces or large regions within a province. 
Therefore, they can be used to calculate provincial averages. In a significant number 
of cases, however, I am forced to take the wages listed in local collective contracts as 
an estimate of the provincial average.  
 
Moreover, there is a legitimate concern that these collective contracts were not 
fully enforced. However, since these collective contracts were revised and approved 
by the Ministry of Labour, there was an easy recourse to strikes voicing the breaking 
of a legally sanctioned collective contract.  In many cases, prefects levied fines for 
employers who did not comply with collective contracts.63 Moreover, workers could 
use labour courts to denounce recalcitrant employers disregarding legal working 
conditions, which in most cases favoured workers.64  
 
Even if we accept collective contracts as a valid source for wages, calculating 
the ratio of harvest-to-winter wages is not obvious. For example, one needs to take 
into account whether the worker was fed or lodged by the employer. This is relatively 
easy to do as collective contracts generally established very clearly when part of the 
wages was paid in kind.65 Because seasonal wages are not given, I took as harvest 
wages the wages of harvesters who used scythe or sickle (workers on mechanical 
harvesters earned higher wages but also provided more capital). For winter, I 
calculated the average daily wage for tasks like hoeing, digging, sowing or weeding. 
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Because my argument is about the re-distribution of rents towards local 
workers and because an unknown share of temporary migrations happened within 
some provinces, using provincial wages might not be suitable for the task at hand. 
Provincial averages potentially mix the wages of workers in areas receiving 
immigrants and in areas expelling emigrants in the same province. Yet, in most cases, 
wages aggregated at the level of the province are the only option. Wages published in 
1915 are the averages of wages of towns in the same province that responded to the 
survey sent by the Instituto de Reformas Sociales. Furthermore, several collective 
contracts in the 1930s standardized wages at the level of the province or at the level of 
a large region within a province.  
 
Provincial averages were probably calculated with wage observations from a 
selected sample of towns that replied to the government survey.66  This probably 
biases the sample used to calculate summer wages to observations from towns with a 
harvest labour market. Moreover, 1930s collective agreements on harvest wages, 
which I take as provincial averages, are in fact either the average of local harvest 
wages or the standardised harvest wage of the towns that specialised in growing 
cereals.67 
 
Changes in seasonal ratios could be affected by changes in the relative price of 
wheat. Most European governments protected domestic cereal producers with high 
tariffs and Spain was no exception. However, it is unlikely that wheat prices had 
much of a distorting effect on wage ratios: rather stable since 1925, wheat prices 
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increased less than the cost-of-living from 1913 to 1935 (wheat prices increased by 45 
per cent and the cost-of-living by 65 per cent).68 Given the relative evolution of the 
domestic price of wheat, it looks unlikely that wheat producers were more protected 
in the 1930s than before.  
 
Furthermore, the evolution of seasonal wage ratios could be affected by 
mechanisation. As I have said above, mechanical harvesters spread slowly in South 
Castile and Andalusia and a bit faster in North Castile. However, because I only look 
at the wages of manual harvesters, my ratios are not contaminated by the (slow) 
spread of mechanical harvesters between 1914 and 1931.  
 
Finally, one needs to take into account changes in maximum hours of work.69 
The Republican government extended the existing mandatory eight-hour ceiling to 
workers in agriculture. In fact, most collective contracts established a maximum 
working day of 8 hours for the harvest, and in some cases of seven or six hours, 
including several restrictions to overtime hours.70 Therefore, our estimates of daily 
wages for 1932-1933 are no longer for the traditional “dawn to dusk” schedule (“de 
sol a sol”), but for an eight-hour day. Maximum hour ceilings only had some bite in 
the summer, when sunlight allowed for longer working hours. Hours in the winter 
were always short because there are fewer hours of sunlight in the winter (generally 
allowing an 8-hour day). Therefore, before 1931, part of the seasonal wage gap 
reflected that hours of work were longer in the summer. However, the seasonal gap in 
the 1930s was mitigated by the fact that standard hours of work in the summer were 
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not much longer than winter hours. In other words, looking at seasonal gaps in daily 
wages underestimates the true seasonal gap.   
 
In order to establish the credibility of my test using seasonal gaps, I replicate 
the analysis of Sokoloff and Dollar (1997) and look at the correlations between the 
harvest-to-winter wage ratios and the level of cereal specialisation in each province. I 
have constructed two estimates of the harvest-to-winter ratio: the first considers the 
difference between the average male rural wage in the summer with the average male 
rural wage in the winter, the second the maximum wage in the summer relative to the 
average wage in the winter. It makes sense to look at the two because the correlation 
coefficient between the two ratios is about 0.4. I have replicated the same exercise 
with evidence on wage ratios from the early 1930s. 
 
 
Figures 2, 3 and 4 show the correlation between wage ratios and the 
proportion of agricultural land dedicated to cereals.71 The graphs show clearly how in 
all cases seasonal wage ratios were positively related to the specialisation in cereal 
production. In the case of the 1930s, ratios should be considered comparable to ratios 
calculated with average summer and winter wages in 1914. The relationship between 
the wage ratios and cereal specialisation is always statistically significant. 
 
 
Figure 2. Harvest-to-winter wage ratios in 1914 and cereal specialisation (using 
average summer and winter wages) 
                                                 
71
 The proportion excludes land left fallow, but results do not change if fallow land is included. I have 
used the Statistical Yearbook of Spain for 1922-1923 because previous yearbooks did not break down 
the uses of agricultural land for each province.  
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Figure 3. Harvest-to-winter wage ratios in 1914 and cereal specialisation 
(using maximum summer and winter wages) 




Were ratios before the 1930s exceptional with respect to other historical 
cases? The unweighted average of the average wage ratio of the top ten cereal-
growing areas in 1914 was 182, which is below the ratios calculated by Sokoloff and 
Dollar (also unweighted averages of several scattered observations) for counties 
specialising in cereals in England in the mid 19th century (220) and above the gaps 
calculated for the North East and Massachusetts in the US (142 and approximately 
170), which were areas not heavily specialised in growing cereals.72 The Spanish case 
seems to lie between these two experiences.  
 
For my purposes, what matters is whether harvest-to-winter wage ratios 
increased as a result of institutional restrictions on the entry of temporary migrants 
into local labour markets in harvest time. As I have said, since I basically have 1914 
as a benchmark for the situation before 1931, this comparison is audacious. Moreover, 
because the official workday in the 1930s was shorter in the summer but left winter 
hours mostly unaltered, the comparisons underestimate the true evolution of the 
change in the ratios. With this caveats in mind, table 1 presents the estimates of the 
seasonal ratios in three different points of time. 
 
 
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE 
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Table 1 shows that harvest-to-winter ratios increased in the 1930s with respect 
to 1914 wages. The average went up 20 per cent using my preferred comparison with 
average wages in 1914 and 13 per cent when I use maximum wages. In both cases, the 
difference in the means of 1914 ratios and the 1930s ratio is statistically significant. 
Alhough I am in no position to know winter and summer hours in 1914 in each 
province, I can derive harvest-to-winter wages for hourly wages assuming reasonable 
eight-hour working days in the winter and a eleven-hour working days in the summer 
for 1914 and an eight-hour working days in the winter and and in the summer after 
1931. This goes some way in adjusting daily wages for working time, but also I 
should take into account for how long workers stayed employed in each season. When 
the necessary adjustments are done for hours of work, the size of the change is very 
large, I estimate an increase in the harvest-to-winter ratios of approximately 66 per 
cent for ratios calculated with average wages and 60 per cent for ratios calculated with 
maximum wages.  
 
In the case of the comparison with 1924-1925 ratios, the sample size is much 
smaller but in several cases, with the exception of Badajoz, the ratios also increased in 
the 1930s with respect to the mid 1920s or stayed the same. Although sample size is 
restricted to only six matched observations, the change in the ratio is close to 20 per 
cent (using daily wages and not adjusting for hours of work).  As in the case of the 
1914-1930s comparison, taking into account hours of work would increase the 
estimated increase in wage ratios. 
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Summing up, although the evidence is sparse and in some cases difficult to 
interpret, the evolution of harvest-to-winter wage ratios between 1914 and the 1930 
suggest summer wages increased with respect to winter wages. I have argued that this 
evolution cannot be explained by changes in wheat prices or by mechanisation. The 
evidence on the evolution of wage ratios is consistent with the hypothesis of a re-
distribution of rents towards local workers, whereas it is difficult to square with 
“bottom-up” arguments of peasant mobilization.  
 
VII   
Quantitative data on strikes and union implementation are also not consistent with 
bottom-up narratives of rural mobilisation. I look firstly at the grievances put forward 
in rural strikes and the number of strikes won, and show that they are not consistent 
with bottom-up explanations. In addition, I exploit a new data set of strikes and union 
implementation matched with local data on patterns of landownership and the 
proportion of landless workers in the overall peasant population. I use these variables 
to refute bottom-up arguments. Firstly, I study the correlations between rural 
militancy and the concentration of land ownership in each town, which proxies the 
ability of landowners to organise collectively. Secondly, in order to measure the 
impact of poverty and unemployment on conflict, I look at the correlations between 
mobilisation and the proportion of more vulnerable landless labourers. 
 
Official strike data have several shortcomings, especially because they 
underestimate the number of strikes organised by anarcho-syndicalist unions and lack 
information on a large number of strikes. However, they convey a powerful insight: 
explanations of rural conflict based on a frustration-aggression response by workers 
or on a decline in living standards must be challenged by the fact that agricultural 
 27 
workers won a large amount of strikes until June 1934. At the same time, most of 
these strikes asked for a pay rise or a new collective contract and only very few were 
caused by unemployment or the need to enforce previously agreed working 
conditions. For example, in 1932-1933, 70 per cent of agricultural strikes with known 
motivations presented more than one demand to employers. According to the 
tabulated tables in the Spanish statistical yearbooks, a third of strikes were organised 
to change the “organisation of work,” which most probably meant new collective 
contracts.73 In 1931, rural workers obtained a concession from employers in 85 per 
cent of strikes, although they organized a fairly low number of them.74 Strikes 
multiplied by two in 1932 and workers were still able to win 70 per cent of strikes 
(meaning they at least won a concession from employers).75 In 1933, a year with a 
poor harvest, 80 per cent of strikes were won, despite an almost three-fold increase in 
the number of strikes with respect to 1931.76 No frustration-aggression response can 
explain these overwhelming ratios of won strikes.  
 
 My second attempt to refute the alternative hypothesis of bottom-up 
mobilisation involves the analysis of the diffusion of union offices and rural general 
strikes. Because union offices and strikes are underestimated for the provinces in 
which the anarcho-syndicalists were important, when approximating the pattern of 
union implementation and of strikes, I concentrate on provinces in which socialist 
unions were dominant. Information from the 1932 FNTT Congress includes data on 
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strikes at the local level (the unit here being a general strike of rural workers in a 
town) or whether the town had a union local in 1932.77  
 
 It is fair to say that data extracted from union sources have potential biases. 
The most plausible bias is that the UGT could increase artificially the number of 
affiliates to look more powerful than they actually were. And the same could happen 
with the number of operative union locals or of strikes.  
 
However, there are grounds for thinking unions did not distort their numbers 
significantly. The main federations did not report spectacular membership levels. At 
around 25 %, union densities in Spain in the 1930s remained below union density 
levels of more industrialised economies. When for example one looks at the 
penetration of the UGT in several provinces, one sees immediately that a large 
proportion of towns did not have a union local or did not stage a strike in 1932. Union 
sources recognised several towns were not covered by collective contracts. Unions, 
moreover, did not abstain from reporting losses in membership. Although unions 
might have had incentives to over-report membership levels, union records do not 
seem to have obvious biases. 
 
Local information on union offices and general strikes is, firstly, matched to a 
census of peasants collected in 1933, which breaks down the composition of peasants 
in each judicial district (which in turn had several towns) into landless labourers, 
sharecroppers, and small owners. 78 Secondly, it is matched to Pascual Carrión’s 
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estimates of local land ownership inequality, proxied by the proportion of agricultural 
land concentrated in estates of more than 250 hectares (around 340 football pitches).79  
  
I use the proportion of agricultural land in each town taken by large estates as 
a proxy for the ability of landowners to organise collectively. If land ownership was 
concentrated, fewer landowners could coordinate more easily the resistance against 
labour legislation and the new collective contracts. Therefore, I expect the fraction of 
local land occupied by large estates to be positively correlated with conflict. 
Furthermore, the proportion of landless labourers captures the presence of potentially 
volatile landless workers who would have been severely hurt by unemployment and 
poor harvests. I also expect a positive coefficient for this variable.    Moreover, in 
order to control for other factors like access to information or externalities coming 
from other unionised sectors, or to control for potential biases in the reporting of 
strikes, strike and union data are matched to the size of the towns, using information 
from the 1930 Population census. I evaluate the probability of observing strikes and 
finding a union office in 390 towns in the provinces of Badajoz and Cáceres (in 
Extremadura), in Ciudad Real (in South Castile) and in Jaén (Andalusia), all dry-
farming areas in which the UGT was the dominant union. I estimate the following 
equations for 390 towns in Badajoz, Cáceres, Jaén and Ciudad Real: 
 
Pr (strike =1) = α1 + β1* ln (population) + χ1*ln (% landless) + δ1*ln (% estates 
>250 hec) + ε1. 
 
Pr (union local=1) = α2 + β2* ln (population) + χ2* ln (% landless) + δ2* ln (% 
estates >250 hec) + ε2, 
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 Table 2 gives the basic correlations between the explanatory variables. Table 3 
reports the marginal effects from the set of probit regressions on the determinants of 
strikes in 1932 and the determinants of union presence. I check the robustness by 
including/excluding some of the three variables and analysing the stability of 
coefficients when I take into account a sub-sample of the data (for example only 
looking at towns with less than 10’000 inhabitants). The table shows marginal effects 
when the sample is restricted to towns with less than 10’000 inhabitants, but results 
are very similar when only towns with less than 5’000 inhabitants are taken into 
account.  
 
TABLE 2 AND TABLE 3 HERE 
 
All in all, neither the greater presence of landless peasants nor the inequality 
of land ownership increased the likelihood of general strikes or of finding a union 
local. These results also hold when I remove the town population variable. All of this 
lends little support to bottom-up arguments. The main determinant of union presence 
or of strikes is the size of the town, and this result holds even if we restrict the sample 
to towns with less than 10’000 inhabitants or with less than 5’000. Although it 
routinely appears in quantitative analyses of social conflict, the interpretation of the 
marginal effect of population is not obvious. Externalities from well-organised 
artisanal sectors in the more diversified larger towns could be an explanation.80 One 
could argue as well that large towns had greater access to information.81  
 
                                                 
80
 Hobsbawm and Rudé, Swing, pp. 163-183; Kaplan, “Andalusian.” 
81
 Markoff, “Geography.” 
 31 
VII  
This paper studies the impact of state intervention in rural labour markets in the rapid 
increase in mobilisation and conflict in the dry-farming areas of Spain. I refute the 
view that poor harvests or the expectations generated by land reform caused the 
explosive mobilisation of the period. In a largely agrarian country with an 
underdeveloped mass education system, collective action problems were generally so 
severe as to require top-down, state intervention to mobilise rural workers. 
 
This paper has concentrated on two types of legal changes. Firstly, hiring 
practices in areas with a large rural labour market (especially during the harvest) went 
through drastic changes. Qualitative information on dry-farming labour markets 
strongly suggests unions controlled who was hired during the harvest, in a context of 
short working years with acute competition for scarce harvest jobs. Moreover, 
qualitative evidence on rural conflict in the period and quantitative information on the 
evolution of seasonal gaps are both consistent with a sharp reduction of temporary 
migrations after 1931. Union control over the local labour market and the collapse of 
competition from strikebreakers greatly facilitated collective action taking the form of 
rising union participation and a greater number of strikes.  
 
The Spanish case confirms the view that conflict and militancy are not 
necessarily related to drastic changes in living standards. Often, institutional change 
and policy shifts are the causes of polarisation and popular mobilisation. The Spanish 
experience of the 1930s points at the role of non-ideological motivations behind the 
growth of militant social movements. In many developing economies, access to scarce 







AE: Anuario Estadística de España, Spanish statistical yearbook. 
CNT: Confederación Nacional del Trabajo, National Confederation of Labour. 
FNTT: Federación Nacional de Trabajadores de la Tierra, National Federation of 
Agricultural Workers. 
IRS: Instituto de Reformas Sociales, Institute of Social Reforms. 
UGT: Unión General de Trabajadores, General Workers’ Union. 
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Map 1. Regions and IH'ovioces Illeotiooed io Ibis study. 
Source: http ://soYlllapas.colll/categorv/lllapa-mudos/pageJ6, name of provinces alHI 


















1930s Type of collective contract 
1930s 
Albacete 160 167 150 222 Local: Villarrobledo, La 
Roca, Alcaraz 
Almería 157 200  225 Provincial 
Ávila 109 167  160 Provincial 
Badajoz 211 150 223 211 2 regions within province 
Cáceres 173 189 204 233 Provincial 
Cádiz 174 150 142   
Castellón 150 126  150 Local: Burriana 
Ciudad Real 172 175  189 Provincial 
Córdoba 140 160  183 Provincial 
Granada 136 175  180 Provincial 
Guadalajara 220 267  160 Provincial 
Huelva 138 160  175 Local: Aracena 
Jaén 181 175 170 170 Local: Martos, Villacarrillo 
León 155 182  225 Provincial 
Málaga 122 160  169 Local (Málaga) 
Palencia 147 182 175   
Salamanca 172 167  220 Provincial 
Seville 165 160  180 Provincial, regional 
Toledo 174 143 200 222 Local: Madridejos 
Valencia 127 160 141 163 Local: Chiva 
Valladolid 187 200  250 Provincial 



































t-test differences in means: 
The null hypothesis is that 
the means are equal: 
average ratio 1914 vs. 
ratio1930 
t =-4.18*** 




Sources: own elaboration from AE 1915, El Socialista (April 1924-1925), González Rothvoss, 










Table 2. Correlations between the explanatory variables 
 Ln (pop1930) Ln (% landless) 
Ln (% landless) 0.13  
Ln (% large estates) -0.04 -0.15 
 Notes: own calculations. 
 






































































       
N 390 390 390 390 350 350 
Log likelihood -250.2 -138 -265.3 -142 -227.9 -118.3 
Chi Squared 25.4*** 6.94* 1.71 0.05 20.4*** 3.92 
Pseudo R Sq 0.05 0.02 0.003 0.0002 0.04 0.02 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. * means statistically significant at the 1 per cent level, ** at the 








































































Figure 2. Harvest-to-winter wage in 1914 and cereal specialisation (using average 
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Figure 3. Harvest-to-winter wage ratio in 1914 and cereal specialisation (using 
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Source: González Rothvoss, Anuario; AE 1932-1933, pp. 126-127. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
